Red Sea Shipping Takes Another Blow From Iran

Just hours after 2024 began, Iran dispatched the warship frigate Alborz to the Red Sea. His arrival was further bad news for shipping. Which was already in crisis due to attacks on commercial ships by the Iranian-backed Houthis. The first few days of the year saw a flurry of new attacks by the Houthis. Leaders are wondering whether to risk sailing through the Red Sea and the vital Suez Canal. Without knowing what Iran is planning or how the United States and its maritime allies will react or take longer.

They have to decide whether to take the expensive route.  Alborz’s arrival was in response to the activities of Operation Prosperity Guardian, a US-led operation to combat Houthi piracy. On New Year’s Eve, a U.S. Navy helicopter aboard the aircraft carrier USS Dwight D. Eisenhower received a distress call from the  Singapore-flagged container ship Maersk Hangzhou in the Red Sea Prosperity Guardian was sailing in the bay after its owner,  Danish shipping company Maersk, deemed it safe enough to sail after its launch. Hours earlier, the U.S. Navy had shot down a Houthi missile fired at Maersk Hangzhou. But the Houthis remained stubborn. 

They returned again in her four small boats, fired on the container ship, and attempted to board and hijack it. This time, the U.S. Navy counterattacked by sinking three boats. Ten militiamen were killed. Maersk has again rerouted its ships. The Danish giant was not alone. An average of 315 ships passed through the Red Sea every day from December 25 to 31, according to figures from Lloyd’s List Intelligence. During the same period in 2022, there will be 385 ships operating per day, compared to an average of 386 ships per day in November last year.

Less than a day after the U.S. Navy sank three Houthi ships, the Alborz sailed through the Gulf of Aden and anchored in a port. The British-built Alborz is not the crowning achievement of the Iranian Navy: She turns 55 this year. In recent months, Iran has built up its navy. A combat patrol boat named after Iranian general Qassem Suleimani, who was killed in a U.S. drone strike in 2020, will reportedly be added in 2022. The Iranian navy said it could “evade detection” and “carry out various operations in distant waters.

” The Navy also “accepted a variety of locally developed and produced military equipment, including the advanced radar-evading cruiser Abu Mahdi Al-Muhandis and 100 fast-attack vessels,” as well as missile boats.

It was reported on January 6th. Concerningly,  the new warship will be able to “sail within a radius of 2,000 nautical miles without being detected by enemy radar or surveillance systems,” according to the Navy, and it took just 15 months to build in Iran. That means they haven’t. Despite the Alborz’s age, the Iranian government has used it in the past to escort Iranian merchant ships suspected of transporting weapons to the Houthis.

The arrival of the Alborz has great significance, and shipping managers must determine what exactly that significance is. “Alborz’s arrival is definitely a warning and a further escalation,” said Neil Roberts,  secretary of the maritime insurance industry’s Joint Warfare Committee. “But it’s not clear what their job is.  Will the Alborz once again simply escort Iranian merchant ships carrying weapons to the Houthis? Or will the U.S. Navy and other Western powers intervene in response to a Houthi offensive in the Red Sea?

“It’s unclear what the Iranians are going to do in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden,” said Simon Lockwood,  shipping manager at insurance broker Willis Towers Watson. “Is that interference with the United States’ combined fleet?” Iran’s Revolutionary Guards have long attacked commercial ships in the Strait of Hormuz (as stated in foreign policy and elsewhere), but the Strait of Hormuz is Iran’s mainland, and the Red Sea is It is the mainland of Iran. The other side of the Arabian Peninsula.

On January 5, Maersk diverted all its container ships from the Red Sea to the Cape of Good Hope route. The next day, the Houthis launched two more attacks. Indeed, it is almost impossible to predict what  Alborz’s mission in the Red Sea will be and whether additional Iranian naval vessels will participate, but that is precisely what shipping managers need to do. It must not happen. 

(Iran has also long had surveillance vessels in the Red Sea.) “Right before countries launched Prosperity Guardian, ship owners were on the verge of starting large-scale diversions from the Red Sea,” Roberts noted.”Maersk then decided to re-enter the Red Sea and is now changing direction again. At every distribution center, executives are debating whether to make the diversion. “We are being targeted. “Is it true?” you need to judge. Are you not going to do that? But it’s not just a matter of the Houthis deciding to target your ship. Anyone can get hit. These missiles are not particularly accurate. ” It is precisely the arbitrariness of the attack that frightens the shipping industry. Shipping companies and seafarers deal with storms on a regular basis because they are predictable and follow certain patterns.

This is not the case with the Houthis’ designation of “Israel-related” vessels. Of course, there is also the risk of further fires from Iran. But there is also a risk of an increase in Houthi missiles and other attacks. That’s because the Alborz, and likely other Iranian ships in the Red Sea, would be too dangerous for the U.S. Navy and its partner Prosperity Guardian to respond to a Houthi attack. War risk premiums in the Red Sea have already reached headline numbers of  0.45 to 1 percent, far exceeding premiums for dangerous ports like Benghazi. As of early December,  the Red Sea’s main interest rate was still around 0.07%. 

This means, for example, that a $10 million total ship could pay an additional $100,000 in war risk premiums. However, shipping managers are not only in the dark about  Alborz’s mission and whether other Iranian naval vessels will join it or stand alone in the Red Sea to watch but also about Prosperity Guardian’s goals. I’m not sure, either. “Is it purely defensive? forward-facing (set up to pre-emptively attack Houthi forces)? “Is it  to create an ally corridor?” Roberts asked. “It appears that the allies have not yet agreed on a strategy. “Once the industry has more clarity about what Prosperity Guardian will do, leaders can make  clearer decisions.” But the decision will also depend on whether leaders believe the mission is effective and what further steps Iran takes in response.

On January 5, Mohammed Ali al-Houthi, chairman of the Houthi Supreme Revolutionary Committee,  told the BBC that all countries in the Red Sea Union would be subject to attacks on their ships and agreed to the conditions. I pulled it up. How exactly this is defined is up to the Houthis. Depending on the outcome of the conflict between Israel and Hamas, Iran’s intentions may naturally change. The Iranian government may conclude that the mere presence of the Alborz and perhaps other ships in the Red Sea will be enough to scare Western shipping companies and sway the Coalition of Prosperity Guardians.

However, if the frigate is in disputed waters, there is a  risk of a dangerous collision. What would the U.S. Navy do if the Alborz,  perhaps along with other Iranian naval vessels, came to the rescue of a Houthi ship under the U.S.? No wonder the shipping industry predicts that ships will face boarding by militias and attacks from drones, anti-ship missiles, and improvised explosive devices at sea this month alone.

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