The Resurgence of Russia-Cuba Friendship
Recent naval exercises by Russian warships—including the Admiral Gorshkov frigate and the Kazan nuclear submarine—in Havana have attracted considerable attention from strategic circles worldwide. Given comparisons with historical precedents and the intensity of the current dynamics of great power strategic competition, echoes of the Cold War are inevitable but perhaps somewhat exaggerated.
In fact, a deeper analysis suggests that this development—rather than portending an ominous shift or tectonic elimination—is consistent with the long-term geopolitical landscape and the gradual convergence of Moscow and Havana’s national interests in the post-Cold War era.
Precedents of Prophecy
Since the Age of Exploration, Cuba has been a strategic hub worth controlling. As the largest island in the Greater Antilles, this isolated tropical outpost (the center of the “American Mediterranean,” according to geopolitical theorist Nicholas Spykman) is a gateway to much of the Caribbean, the Atlantic, and the Gulf of Mexico.
Just like the northern and southern landmasses of the American continent. At the height of its imperial power, the Spanish crown’s control over Cuba played an important role in the military adventures of the conquistadors and in the logistical management of the highly profitable trade network established between the Spanish Main and the Iberian port of Seville.
Not surprisingly, Cuba was often the target of European pirates. At the end of the nineteenth century, the United States, per the geopolitical fundamentals of the Monroe Doctrine, used force to expel the Spanish from their last strongholds in the American hemisphere, including Cuba. Shortly after Cuba’s independence, Mexico considered annexing Cuba based on various historical, social, and cultural commonalities, but the project ultimately did not materialize.
After the outbreak of the Cuban Revolution in 1959, Cuba joined the geopolitical orbit of the Soviet Union. In return, the Kremlin secured a bridgehead in the American hemisphere. This favorable mutual coexistence resulted from strategic, political, and economic factors. At the strategic level, as the great power opposite to the United States in the bipolar equilibrium, the Soviet Union became the full security guarantor of the Cuban state, bearing the corresponding costs and risks. Despite the Cubans’ position as a junior partner, they played a very proactive role in the joint intervention.
To support Moscow’s conventional and covert operations in some of the most controversial theaters of the so-called “Third World,” Cuban troops and intelligence officers participated in peripheral theaters of operations such as the Middle East, sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia. To clarify, in these proxy wars, Cubans fought enemies such as right-wing paramilitary squads from South America, mercenaries from South Africa, and even regular soldiers from the Israel Defense Forces.
A Long-Standing Geopolitical Relationship
To the Soviets, Cuban intelligence services were as valuable, if not more valuable, than the Stasi in East Germany, thanks to their expertise in the covert implementation of “active measures.” Havana (along with Berlin, Vienna, Geneva, and Mexico City) became one of the Cold War’s most prominent hotspots and dens of espionage.
Cuba also joined the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON). This Soviet-led economic bloc included communist or communist-leaning countries such as Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, and Vietnam. Given the Cuban economy’s backwardness compared to the more industrially advanced nations within the Soviet fold, Cuba received economic aid, subsidies, and oil supplies in exchange for agricultural products such as sugar.
The projection of Soviet “soft power” was strong in Cuba despite obstacles such as geographic distance and disparate cultural norms that were difficult to bridge. Thousands of Cuban students—especially the best and brightest, as well as members of the Communist Party elite—were educated in the Soviet Union, and Russian was widely taught on the island. Yet, while the foreign policies of both countries were largely driven by the imperatives of Richelieu’s realpolitik, both Havana and Moscow shared a common ideological commitment to the doctrine of socialist revolution.
However, while both countries’ foreign policies were driven primarily by the needs of Richerian realpolitik, Havana and Moscow shared a common ideological commitment to the doctrine of socialist revolution. This partnership lasted until the collapse of the Soviet Union.
From the US perspective, Cuba itself posed no meaningful threat. However, the island’s geopolitical position as a platform for intervention by extra-regional powers posed serious problems for Washington. Using Cuba as a launching pad, the Soviets could incite armed sabotage in much of Latin America, threaten the US East Coast, attack the Panama Canal, and target the mouth of the Mississippi River – a vital artery of the US economy – putting the heart of the US oil industry in their crosshairs.
These concerns led to a strong reaction from Washington in the context of the Cuban Missile Crisis (known in Russia as the “Caribbean Crisis”). This situation ultimately reached a dead end. Hard-line members of the Politburo agreed without hesitation to cancel plans to deploy ballistic missiles in Cuba, and in return the Kennedy administration withdrew Jupiter missiles from Turkey and agreed not to intervene militarily in Cuba directly. The CIA and hard-line factions in the Cuban exile community in Florida were frustrated.
During the Expatriate Period
After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, and the collapse of the Soviet Union, Cuba was in a precarious position. Without strategic support and Soviet funding, Cuba was largely on its own. In the early 1990s — in line with Francis Fukuyama’s and others’ views about the “inevitable march toward liberal democracy” — Cuba was viewed in much of the Western world as a stale relic of a bygone era, with regime change expected sooner or later.
But more than three decades later, the Cuban government has proven itself resilient enough to withstand natural disasters, economic hardship, geopolitical tensions, intermittent internal political turmoil, and even the effects of its mismanagement.
During the so-called “Special Period,” the Cuban government had no choice but to diversify its economic partnerships, mitigate hostility toward the Americans, and implement modest reforms to boost hard currency inflows through joint ventures, remittances, state-owned enterprises, biotechnology development and primary commodity exports, and the encouragement of tourism. However, while the Cuban economy has not collapsed, underperformance and stagnation have become chronic phenomena. According to the Harvard Atlas of Economic Complexity, Cuba’s economy primarily depends on primary product exports, and its structural complexity has declined significantly since 1995.
Russia took an indifferent approach to Cuba at the time, as it lacked the bandwidth or resources to focus on the Caribbean region. Domestic political crises, such as the Chechen war, economic turmoil, and the need to adjust foreign policy in line with Western trends, caught Moscow’s attention.
Moreover, the Cubans echoed Russia’s lack of interest. Fidel Castro and his rule were not keen on replicating policies based on the principles of glasnost and reform, as they considered such a course of action to be harmful, if not outright suicidal. The subsequent era of “Weimar Russia” was not a desirable model either. During this decade, relations between the two countries were officially friendly but cold and lacking in substance. In 2002, due to financial constraints, Vladimir Putin’s government closed the Lourdes Seguiner station.
The wiretapping center, used to spy on Americans, was seen as an expensive relic of an outdated Cold War. In contrast, Havana mobilized its intelligence capabilities to find new donors in Latin America. Raúl Castro, allegedly attracted by the success of China’s new trade development strategy, is also interested in strengthening economic cooperation with Beijing. Seeking to further hedge through détente, Havana welcomed the diplomatic moves that finally normalized relations with Washington nearly a decade ago.
Back to the future?
Cubans and Russians are disillusioned with the United States despite some symbolic gestures. Cuba feels disenfranchised because, despite relatively low levels of mutual hostility, the restrictions imposed by the US trade embargo still hinder the spread of bilateral economic exchanges and trade relations. Instead of lifting or relaxing these economic coercive measures, Republican and Democratic administrations have reinforced them.
Russia’s frustration is due to Washington’s unwillingness to support the Eurasian country’s reemergence as a post-Soviet power, establish a partnership, rearrange the European security architecture to accommodate Russian interests, or even negotiate a redistribution of European resources spheres of influence.
Moscow’s dissatisfaction with unipolarity has become increasingly evident since President Vladimir Putin’s speech at the Munich Security Conference 2007. Therefore, this situation creates an opportunity to restore strategic bilateral relations between these countries.
The rapprochement between Moscow and Havana began in the late 2000s. Cuba welcomed Russian economic assistance in the context of the 2008 global financial crisis, the devastating effects of extreme weather events, urgent economic needs, and an interest in embracing strategic multilateralism in an increasingly multi-centric world order.
Moscow has forgiven 90 percent of Soviet-era debts that would have been unpayable anyway. While Russians are not necessarily interested in money dealing with Cuba, such concessions cannot be charitable. Details of the corresponding swaps have not yet been disclosed. Still, it is more likely that the Kremlin is seeking strategic political and economic benefits rather than pursuing purely commercial interests in Cuban primary products such as cigars, coffee, bananas, rum, or sugar.
For example, Rosneft has been evaluating the prospects for exploiting offshore fossil fuel deposits in Cuban territorial waters. Although no substantial discoveries have been made, Cuba has become a consumer of Russian crude oil, a lifeline that helps Cuba overcome its worsening energy shortages. Similarly, by supplying wheat, Russia has helped improve Cuba’s poor food security situation. In return, Cuba supports Russia’s diplomatic stance on many controversial issues and its military intervention in many areas of the so-called “near abroad”, including Georgia, Kazakhstan and Ukraine.
Rumors about the actual presence of Russian strategic bombers at Cuban airfields and the reactivation of the Lourdes signals intelligence facility have been circulating for years. Likewise, as an operator of Soviet-made military equipment (including MiG fighters), Cuba has traditionally represented an attractive consumer market for Russian arms, and President Putin himself has threatened to arm countries opposed to the collective West as a disproportionate response to the increase in Russian arms exports to Ukraine from Washington and Brussels. However, the need to divert military supplies to Russia’s war in eastern Ukraine may limit potential sales in the foreseeable future.
In addition, the Russian Federation’s status as a “commodity superpower” indicates an expected interest in Cuban nickel, especially given the strategic application of this industrial metal in manufacturing stainless steel, superalloys, and rechargeable batteries. Access to Cuban nickel reserves under preferential conditions will enhance Russia’s influence in the global ferrous metal market.
In addition, Moscow has offered to support upgrading Cuba’s economic and industrial capabilities, especially in key areas such as nuclear energy, infrastructure, communications, and biotechnology. After all, the presence of relatively few foreign companies in the Cuban economy means that Russian companies can take advantage of unique opportunities to operate in a Caribbean country with little competition.
Although Russian checks are insufficient to transform Cuba into a world-class developed center like Singapore, strengthening relations with Moscow is a useful complementary tool to prevent over-dependence on economic partners such as China or Brazil for imports, exports, and investment projects.
Future of Financial Innovation
On the other hand, Cuba is a testing ground for financial innovations in the governance of the Russian economic state.
In December 2023, the Russian National Card Payment System launched Mir payment cards in Cuba, the equivalent of Western payment cards such as Visa and MasterCard.
Although the initial implementation of these cards in Cuban tourist resorts such as Havana and Varadero did not have the strength to challenge the United States’ lead in international finance, it did indicate a common interest in trying to develop parallel structures designed to circumvent transnational circuits supported by U.S. dollar hegemony.
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However, while this growing partnership is in the national interests of Russians and Cubans, its scope is limited. Neither Moscow nor Havana is as courageous as during the Cold War. We should not regard the recent symbolic presence of Russian warships in Havana as a prelude to the outbreak of hostilities in the American hemisphere. Even if Russia wanted to, they lacked the deep-sea naval power and logistical capabilities required to launch an exploratory war around Cuba, not to mention the ability to finance such a dangerous adventure.
The Kremlin is no longer a candidate for global hegemony. Post-Cold War Russian policy has strayed from its ideological mission to reshape the world in the Soviet model. However, as a reactionary power interested in reasserting itself on the global strategic chessboard, the most likely explanation is that Moscow wants to accumulate chips, create distractions, divert American attention from the post-Soviet space, and remind Washington that Russia is a force to be reckoned with even in the American hemisphere.
Given the increasing presence of Russian intelligence agents in countries close to the geopolitical periphery of US national security, another potential interest is to obtain Cuba’s cooperation in the “covert and dagger” exercises aimed at fomenting chaos as an asymmetric compensation for NATO’s eastward expansion and inciting “color revolutions” and the delivery of US weapons to Ukraine.
The hypothetical scope of these low-cost operations could include psychological warfare and encouraging the spread of irregular armed agitation. In addition, both Moscow and Havana have a common interest in supporting “Bolivarian” countries such as Venezuela and Nicaragua that are hostile to US interests, as they help promote favorable power relations in the region. In contrast, the Cubans are no longer committed to an ideological campaign to spread the gospel of Marxism in the global South. Their priority is more about survival, and what matters to them is to gather the foundations that can guarantee a reasonable degree of stability and a regional balance of power favorable to their regime’s survival. Moreover, this time, there are fewer ideological coincidences.
Both the Russian Federation and Cuba are illiberal states, but they have little in common in the heterogeneous ideological world of illiberal political thought. Russia is a multiethnic neo-imperialist “security state” run by a cadre of former KGB spies and technocrats (Vladimir Putin himself is no fan of the Bolsheviks and their legacy), while Cuba is one of the last bastions of communism, at least in name only. However, as long as both sides gain something, Cuba and Russia do not have to be fellow travelers to be comrades.
Conclusion
In short, the attempt to reopen the door to connectivity between Moscow and Havana should not be seen as a kabuki show or an empty “smoke and mirrors” exercise. Despite the serious asymmetries, great strategic potential in the bilateral relationship still needs to be tapped.
Especially as both countries are prepared to act confidently in an environment shaped by the realities and demands of a multipolar international system while geopolitical competition continues to shape the bilateral relationship. In many ways, it has increased. This trend, if realized in the coming decades, could affect Latin America’s political and strategic landscape, making it a must-win for great power politics. However, the available evidence suggests that rebuilding such connections will be gradual, selective, and cautious. Moscow and Havana want to cooperate as partners or allies in some areas but not intertwine their destinies.
The ultimate progress of such a partnership must overcome challenges such as persistent mutual distrust, major issues, and limited available resources. Moreover, the waltz between the Russians and Cubans has not achieved the critical mass needed to overturn the polarity structure within the international system, at least not yet.
